

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01

INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01

PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

ERDE-00 /089 W

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P 291554Z 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2236

SECDEF WASH DC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0351

FROM MBFR VIENNA REPRESENTATIVE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF  
JUNE 28, 1977

MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF  
JUNE 28, 1977

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE JUNE 28, 1977 INFORMAL SESSION  
OF THE VIENNA TALKS, THE ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED BY THE  
NETHERLANDS REP, UK REP AND US REP AND THE EAST BY  
SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV, CZECHOSLOVAK REP MEISNER  
AND GDR REP OESER. MILITARY ADVISORS ALSO PARTICIPATED.

2. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES PUSHED FOR REDUCTION OF AIR  
FORCES. THEY REJECTED WESTERN STATEMENTS THAT THE EAST HAD  
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MORE AIRCRAFT THAN THE WEST IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THEY  
AGAIN ASSERTED THAT THE DATA DISCUSSION HAD NOT CONTRIBUTED  
TO BRINGING THE VIEWS OF THE TWO SIDES CLOSER OR TO AGREE-  
MENT ON NUMBERS. THEY ASSERTED THE FAULT LAY WITH THE WEST,  
WHICH HAD PRODUCED NO PROOF OF ITS CONTENTIONS OF EASTERN  
SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER, HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY  
VAGUE WITH REGARD TO ITS POSITION ON EXCLUSIONS FROM ITS

ESTIMATED ON WARSAW PACT FORCES, HAD FAILED TO USE CONCRETE NUMBERS TO EXPRESS THESE ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT FORCES, AND HAD FAILED TO AGREE TO TABLE NATIONAL DATA. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ANSWERED WESTERN QUESTIONS ON WARSAW PACT DATA AND ASKED FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN FIGURES.

3. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES AND GAVE REASONS WHY IT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES TO ENTER ON DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC NOW. REPLYING TO POLISH REP'S REMARKS IN JUNE 21 SESSION, THEY STRESSED NEED OF CONTINUING DATA DISCUSSION SO THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD AGREE ON THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS AND THE LEVEL OF LIMITATIONS. THEY ANSWERED EASTERN QUESTIONS ON WESTERN DATA FROM JUNE 21 SESSION AND ASKED FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT EASTERN DATA.

4. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CLAIMED THAT THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH WENT FURTHER THAN THE WEST REDUCTION APPROACH TOWARDS REDUCING BOTH MANPOWER AND ARMAMENTS. THIS FACT WAS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE EASTERN APPROACH TO THE REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES. THIS EASTERN APPROACH WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE JUNE 28, 1973 COMMUNIQUE ACCORDING TO WHICH ONLY NAVAL FORCES WERE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM REDUCTIONS. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 1975 FORESAW ONLY ONE-TIME REDUCTION OF A SMALL NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AND DID NOT COVER THOSE IN THE HANDS OF NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE COMBINED COMMON CEILING PROPOSED BY THE WEST WOULD PERMIT INCREASES IN AIR FORCES  
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FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS. CONTRARY TO WESTERN ARGUMENTS, AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF BOTH SIDES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. WESTERN ASSERTIONS THAT THE EAST HAD SUPERIORITY IN AIRCRAFT WERE UNFOUNDED, BUT IF THE WEST REALLY CONSIDERED THAT THE EAST HAD MORE AIR-CRAFT, IT WOULD BE LOGICAL FOR IT TO ASK FOR A REDUCTION OF AIRCRAFT. IF THE WEST WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN REDUCING THE LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION IN THE REDUCTION AREA, IT WOULD AGREE TO REDUCE AIR FORCES.

5. UK REP PRESENTED WESTERN CASE FOR DISCUSSING ASSOCIATED MEASURES AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THESE PROPOSALS DESERVED DISCUSSION IN THEIR OWN RIGHT AND WERE NOT MERELY A SUBORDINATE ISSUE TO THE REDUCTIONS. WHILE FINAL DETAILS MIGHT HAVE TO BE POSTPONED UNTIL LATER, IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE TO HAVE A USEFUL CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES NOW WITHOUT THE NEED FOR PRIOR AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION ISSUES. THERE WAS A NEED FOR AGREED EXCEPTIONS BECAUSE THEY CORRESPONDED TO THE MILITARY PRACTICES OF BOTH SIDES. WITHOUT AGREED EXCEPTIONS, THE WEST WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONDUCT EXERCISES PERIODICALLY TO TEST ITS REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THIS REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY AND

OF WESTERN SECURITY. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL THAT ASSOCIATED MEASURES APPLY ONLY TO US AND SOVIET FORCES IN PHASE I WAS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE IT WAS THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCES OF THE TWO WOLD POWERS WHICH WERE POTENTIALLY THE SOURCE OF GREATEST CONCERN.

6. GDR REP SAID THE RESULTS OF DATA DISCUSSION THUS FAR WERE NOT SATISFACTORY. THE DISCUSSION HAD NOT BROUGHT THE VIEWS OF THE TWO SIDES CLOSER. NOR HAD IT BROUGHT MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES IN THE AREA. THE REASONS FOR THIS SITUATION WERE CLEAR: THE WEST CONTINUED TO CLAIM EXISTENCE OF DISPARITIES, BUT FURNISHED NO PROOF OF THEIR EXISTENCE. NOR HAD THE WEST MADE CLEAR ON WHAT BASIS WESTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN FORCES HAD BEEN COMPILED. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY INDEFINITE AS REGARDS  
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EXCLUSIONS THEY HAD MADE FROM WESTERN ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT FORCES. THE WEST DID NOT USE CONCRETE NUMBERS FOR ITS ESTIMATES OF EASTERN FORCES BUT NEBULOUR FORMULAS. THIS PRACTICE

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0351

FROM MBFR VIENNA REP

CONFIRMED THE EASTERN IMPRESSION THAT THE WESTERN ESTIMATES WERE UNRELIABLE AND THAT THE WEST WAS KEEPING ITS ESTIMATES INDEFINITE IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGING THEM. IT WAS INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT THE WEST, WHICH MAINTAINED THAT DATA ON MILITARY FORCES WAS NOT SECRET IN THE WEST, OBJECTED TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO TABLE NATIONAL TOTALS. TO TABLE THIS DATA WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR VALUE BECAUSE MANNING LEVELS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND VARIOUS FORCES IN THE AREA DIFFERED. UNITS FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA WERE MANNED AT A HIGHER LEVEL THAN NATIONAL FORCES, AND UNITS CLOSER TO THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAD A HIGHER LEVEL OF MANNING THAN THOSE FURTHER BACK. ALL THIS WESTERN BEHAVIOR MUST MEAN THAT THE WEST WAS EITHER NOT CONVINCED OF ITS DATA OR HAD NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE WEST REFUSED TO DEPART FROM ITS DISPARITY CONCEPT, EVEN GOING TO THE EXTENT, IN ORDER TO BOLSTER IT, OF PUTTING THE POLISH UNIT FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE SECRET

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COAST UNDER WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES WHILE EXCLUDING SIMILAR WESTERN FORCES FROM ITS COUNT OF NATO FORCES. OWING TO THE WESTERN POSITION, THERE WAS A DANGER OF A TREND IN THE DATA DISCUSSION TOWARDS BECOMING A DISCUSSION OF THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA AND NOT THEIR NUMBER.

7. NETHERLANDS REP ALSO COMMENTED ON THE DATA ISSUE. CONTRARY TO THE EASTERN VIEW THAT DATA DISCUSSION WAS A SECONDARY ISSUE, DISCUSSIONS OF DATA THUS FAR HAD RE-EMPHASIZED THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF DATA TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. AGREEMENT ON DATA WAS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO AGREE ON THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS AND ESTABLISH THE LEVEL OF RESIDUAL LIMITATIONS. THE WEST HAD NOT CLAIMED TO HAVE USED THE SAME SOURCES AS THE EAST IN COMPILING ITS FIGURES ON EASTERN FORCES. BUT IN COMPILING ITS FIGURES ON BOTH SIDES, THE WEST HAD APPLIED THE SAME COUNTING RULES AS REGARDED INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS. THE WEST COULD NOT ACCEPT

THE EASTERN CONTENTION THAT, BECAUSE DATA WAS CHARACTERIZED AS OFFICIAL, IT WAS BY DEFINITION NOT SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE.

8. TARASOV REPLIED TO WESTERN QUESTIONS FROM PREVIOUS SESSIONS. HE SAID POLISH INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES HAD BEEN DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS, ONE OF WHICH HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE WARSAW PACT COUNT AND THE OTHER EXCLUDED FROM IT. THE PERSONNEL OF CADRE UNITS HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE EASTERN FIGURES. MOST EASTERN HELICOPTER PERSONNEL HAD BEEN COUNTED IN GROUND FORCES. A FEW WERE IN AIR FORCES. TARASOV ASKED WHETHER THE WEST HAD INCLUDED IN ITS FIGURES NETHERLANDS' SHORT LEAVE PERSONNEL AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH.

9. US REP ANSWERED EASTERN QUESTIONS FROM THE JUNE 21 SESSION  
CONCERNING WESTERN EXCLUSION OF BORDER GUARD PERSONNEL AND  
ASKED FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT EASTERN DATA. END SUMMARYRESOR  
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## Message Attributes

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